Protein aggregation has been studied for at least 3 decades, and many of the principles that regulate this event are relatively well understood. Here, however, we present a different perspective to explain why proteins aggregate: we argue that aggregation may occur as a side‐effect of the lack of one or more natural partners that, under physiologic conditions, would act as chaperones. This would explain why the same surfaces that have evolved for functional purposes are also those that favour aggregation. In (...) the course of reviewing this field, we substantiate our hypothesis with three paradigmatic examples that argue for the generality of our proposal. An obvious corollary of this hypothesis is, of course, that targeting the physiological partners of a protein could be the most direct and specific approach to designing anti‐aggregation molecules. Our analysis may thus inform a different strategy for combating diseases of protein aggregation and misfolding. (shrink)

Protein misfolding is a topic that is of primary interest both in biology and medicine because of its impact on fundamental processes and disease. In this review, we revisit the concept of protein misfolding and discuss how the field has evolved from the study of globular folded proteins to focusing mainly on intrinsically unstructured and often disordered regions. We argue that this shift of paradigm reflects the more recent realisation that misfolding may not only be an adverse event, as originally (...) considered, but also may fulfil a basic biological need to compartmentalise the cell with transient reversible granules. We nevertheless provide examples in which structure is an important component of a much more complex aggregation behaviour that involves both structured and unstructured regions of a protein. We thus suggest that a more comprehensive evaluation of the mechanisms that lead to aggregation might be necessary. (shrink)

One 1120 pages volume, with 4000 entries covering - Western philosophy: authors, schools, concepts and terminology; - religions, cultural anthropology, eastern philosophies; - Psychology and psychoanalysis; - linguistics and semiotics; - sociology and political theory.

In a world of deep political divisions and rising inequality, people feel the need for some form of collective resistance and transformative joint action. Calls for solidarity are heard everywhere. This book presents a critical proposal to guide our reflection on what solidarity is and why it matters. How is solidarity distinct from related ideas such as altruism, justice and fellow-feeling? What value does acting in solidarity with others have? In his lead essay, Andrea Sangiovanni offers compelling answers to (...) these questions, arguing that solidarity is not just a fuzzy stand-in for feelings of togetherness but a distinctive social practice for an anxious age. His ideas are then put to the test in a series of responses from some of the world’s foremost philosophers and political theorists. (shrink)

I always learn something new when I come here, and I also get an idea of what is of present interest at various universities, in philosophy, in education. I go home with ideas, questions, thoughts—...

This book describes the urgent need of modern humanity to renew and reinforce an open attitude to the complexity of life, above all by embracing its intrinsic indeterminacy, rather than attempting futilely to control its evolution. Oblivious to this ever-more urgent necessity, seduced by the speed and virality of digital pattern recognition, computing, and artificial simulation of human thought, society has reverted to a linear, deterministic concept of reality, under the belief that everything can be measured and managed, and that (...) error and predictability will soon be eliminated from our lives and organizations. Consequently, choices and responsibilities have been delegated to technology, artificial intelligence and algorithms, even in educational institutions, which are now preoccupied with teaching mere skills and know-how, thus committing the fatal error of confusing artificial, mechanical, complicated systems with living, complex, adaptive systems. This volume is intended not only for complexity/social scientists, philosophers and students, but to the curious from all wakes of life. It calls for learning to inhabit complexity, while recognizing and participating in its interdependent, interconnected, interactive systems of relationships. Dominici reveals the futility of endeavoring to control the uncontrollable or observe the unobservable, showing how self-organization and emergence, triggered from the smallest and most modest elements, impacts the entire system. (shrink)

Many believe that a citizen who engages in civil disobedience is not exempt from the sanctions that apply to standard law-breaking conduct. Since he is responsible for a deliberate breach of the law, he is also liable to punishment. Focusing on a conception of responsibility as answerability, I argue that a civil disobedient is responsible (i.e. answerable) to his fellows for the charges of wrongdoing, yet he is not liable to punishment merely for breaching the law. To support this claim, (...) I defend an account of political obligation framed in terms of respect for (rather than mere obedience to) the law, and argue that the mere illegality of civil disobedience does not suffice to establish wrongdoing. I then discuss and reject three objections to my argument. (shrink)

Jason Brennan has argued that democracy is intrinsically unjust, for it grants voting power to politically incompetent individuals, thus exposing people to an undue risk of harm. He claims democracy should be replaced by epistocracy, i.e., the rule of the knowers. In this paper, I show that his argument fails. First, Brennan mistakes voters’ competence for voters’ trustworthiness. Second, despite Brennan's claim to the contrary, an epistocracy may not reduce people’s exposure to an undue risk of harm. Third, Brennan overlooks (...) the fact that citizens are not equally affected by ‘bad voting.’ Fourth, far from being a defence of libertarian ideals, Brennan's argument supports paternalism. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been debating the moral justifiability of punishment. However, they have seemingly ignored the adjacent question concerning the moral justifiability of incarceration, as demonstrated by the dearth of philosophical work on prison abolitionism. This silence is puzzling, given that, on closer examination, many philosophers implicitly (or even explicitly) endorse the core assumptions of prison abolitionism. By discussing some examples in the recent literature in philosophy of punishment, I argue that philosophers support prison abolitionism in practice, but not in (...) theory. They endorse the practical strategies in the abolitionist agenda, yet refuse to engage with the normative assumptions that ground them. This ambiguity stems from a deliberate methodological choice that relegates issues concerning the reality of prisons to the margins of the philosophical inquiry. In doing so, philosophers hinder a fair assessment of prison abolitionism as a legitimate moral theory in criminal justice. (shrink)

Edgar Morin writes that “rethinking thinking” is what is urgently needed today. Indeed, it is possible to recognize a convergence in the understanding and practice of an integral and open ontology express and promote the living mystery of Being in its multicolored self-expression. This fact calls for a rereading of the tradition of thought, which has matured through history leading to this point. In this perspective the most significant fruit was produced by the inventio of the ontologically regulating concept of (...) God-Trinity as the interpretive key for the coming in human flesh of the Word/Son Who is God Himself. However, the concept of Trinity failed to completely generate that locus of experience and that relational and communitarian practice of thought corresponding to the Reality it had received and conceived. Our working hypothesis is that philosophy and theology can find the place again for a rebirth and reconfiguration of ontology in the guiding thought of the Trinity, taken up in its original irradiating meaning with the focus on the Christ’s cross/resurrection and examined in the still unfathomed promise it contains. (shrink)

The fair-play theory of punishment claims that the state is justified in imposing additional burdens on law-breakers, to remove the unfair advantage the latter have enjoyed by disobeying the law. From this perspective, punishment reestablishes a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among all citizens. In this paper, I object to this view by focusing on the case of civil disobedience. I argue that the mere illegality of this conduct is insufficient to establish the agent’s unfair advantage over his lawabiding (...) fellows, hence the imposition of additional burdens upon him through legal punishment. I articulate a broader account of citizens’ fair-play duties, able to capture disobedience as well as obedience to the law. While claiming that some law-breakers may not be treated as free-riders, I also gesture at the fact that some law-obeying citizens may not be ‘playing fair’: in some cases, a failure to engage in civil disobedience represents a failure to do one’s own part within the cooperative scheme of society. (shrink)

It is still an open question whether or not Civil Disobedience (CD) has to be completely nonviolent. According to Rawls, “any interference with the civil liberties of others tend to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act”. From this Rawls concludes that by no means can CD pose a threath to other individuals' rights. In this paper I challenge Rawls' view, arguing that CD can comprise some degree of violence without losing its “civil” value. However, I specify that violence (...) must not be aimed at seriously injuring, or even killing, other individuals. This would contravene the communicative aspect of CD. The main claim is that what really is important is that the civil disobedients be willing to accept the punishment following their law-breaking behaviour. By doing so, they demonstrate the conscientiousness of their civilly disobedient action. This also shows that they are aiming for future cooperation with the State, and are expecting the State to be sensitive to their concern for the principles of justice. (shrink)

Acts of civil disobedience, which imply the open violation of a legal directive, often result in the forceful imposition of a choice upon others (e.g. blockades). This is sometimes justifiable, within a democracy, in cases of ‘democratic deficit’, namely, when fundamental rights of an oppressed minority are at stake. In this article, I claim that the use of physical force, in a democracy, may also be justified by the rights of (at least some of) the very people upon whom force (...) is applied. Focusing on the nature of civil disobedience as a ‘form of address’, I argue: (1) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena does not entail infringing upon their status as autonomous agents; (2) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena may contribute to the fulfilment of a positive duty to promote the autonomy of (at least some of) those very people upon whom force is applied. This is not a defence of paternalism: I claim that using force against others, in the democratic arena, may be constitutive of a behaviour that treats others with the respect due to their status as autonomous agents. (shrink)

This paper considers the boundaries of "civility" in civil disobedience, by focusing on an extreme form of protest, namely, bossnapping. The latter involves workers 'kidnapping' their bosses, in order to force them to listen to their grievances. I argue that, notwithstanding its use of force, bossnapping may, under some circumstances, fulfil the requirements of a "civil" act of disobedience.

What is the difference between civil and uncivil disobedience? How can illegal protest be compatible with a democratic regime based on the rule of law? Is Edward Snowden a civil disobedient? This book follows the philosophical debate around these and other issues, showing how the notion of civil disobedience has evolved from a form of passive resistance against injustice, to an active way to engage with the political life of the community. The author presents the major contributions in political and (...) legal philosophy, ranging from John Rawls' seminal account in 1971, to the recent views advanced by Kimberley Brownlee, David Lefkowitz and William Smith. In the last chapter, the author proposes a novel account of civil disobedience, able to meet some of the unresolved challenges. The author argues that, to make sense of civil disobedience, we should expand our conception of political obligation, so to include acts that, despite being illegal, may reveal the agent's civility. (shrink)

Diese Ansicht wird von Kant an einigen Stellen der Kritik der Urteilskraft dargelegt, an denen die Musik als „Sprache der ...

W. S. Di Piero is one of the most capable and wide-ranging poet-critics of his generation. His essays are contemplative, analytical, and interdisciplinary, critical yet arising out of his own artistic practice. Di Piero looks at interrelations between the arts, and at the ways in which the arts express aspects of contemporary culture as well as the individual temperaments and gifts of their makers. These essays are elegant and passionate tributes to the intersection of art and self.

Philosophers have long been debating the moral justifiability of punishment. However, they have seemingly ignored the adjacent question concerning the moral justifiability of incarceration, as demonstrated by the dearth of philosophical work on prison abolitionism. This silence is puzzling, given that, on closer examination, many philosophers implicitly (or even explicitly) endorse the core assumptions of prison abolitionism. By discussing some examples in the recent literature in philosophy of punishment, I argue that philosophers support prison abolitionism in practice, but not in (...) theory. They endorse the practical strategies in the abolitionist agenda, yet refuse to engage with the normative assumptions that ground them. This ambiguity stems from a deliberate methodological choice that relegates issues concerning the reality of prisons to the margins of the philosophical inquiry. In doing so, philosophers hinder a fair assessment of prison abolitionism as a legitimate moral theory in criminal justice. (shrink)

Volume 16, Issue 4, December 2025, Page 858-875.

This article argues that the basic structure of legal justification is ultimately comparativist. This means that comparative facts are necessary to determine whether a legal choice is justified. At first glance, this claim may appear to run counter to a commonly held view about legal justification, for the most basic instances of law application seem to operate in a noncomparative way. Legal choices are normally justified by norms, and norms typically do not require comparison among one's alternatives. In this work, (...) I do not deny that legal justifications are often noncomparative. Building on Ruth Chang's philosophy, however, I argue that the grounds in virtue of which norm-based legal justifications have their normative force are comparative facts—namely, facts according to which one's choice is at least as good as the available alternatives with respect to what matters in legal choice situations (presumably, responding to the reasons given by the law). If the grounds of legal justification are comparative facts, then legal justification is no different from ordinary practical justification. (shrink)

Dieser Band analysiert den Begriff des ‚Abenteuers der Vernunft’, welcher in der dritten Kritik von Kant als Hypothese für die Erklärung des Ursprungs des Lebendigen aufgestellt wird. In systematischer Hinsicht werden vornehmlich zwei Themen behandelt: der kantische Materialismus und das Verhältnis zwischen dem Abenteuer der Vernunft und der kopernikanisch-newtonianischen Wende. Der Nietzsche gewidmete Teil hat das Anliegen, seine Theorie aus dem Jahre 1868 als eine selbständige Erarbeitung physiologischer, empirischer und materialistischer Aspekte des Kantischen Kritizismus zu präsentieren.

RINGRAZIAMENTI Questo libro è l'ampliamento e la prosecuzione della prima parte della tesi per il conseguimento del titolo di dottore di ricerca da me ...

As is well known, any preorder R on a set U induces an Alexandrov topology on U. In some interesting cases related to data mining an Alexandrov topology can be transformed into different types of logico-algebraic models. In some cases, (pre)topological operators provided by Pointless Topology may define a topological space on U even if R is not a preorder. If this is the case, then we call R a crypto-preorder. The paper studies the conditions under which a relation R (...) is a crypto-preorder and how to transform a crypto-preorder into a proper preorder. (shrink)